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Aristocratic Dignity?
DoN HERZOG

On the academic lectern, too, we've leveled up. We're interested in
good arguments, no matter how base or despicable other cultures
might have imagined the speaker. 1£ there still are a lot of white
guys in universities, no one takes seriously the claim that universities are theirs by right.
But it would be mistaken to imagine the lectern (or for that
matter the public sphere) as a place for nothing but the bloodless
give-and-take of reasons. It also is a site for jousting, for thrusts
and parries, cutting objections, and even sneers-for the nerd's version of a duel. So I shall have to begin by disappointing sanguinary
readers: it is always a pleasure to read and listen to Waldron. Then
too, I am entirely sympathetic to his approach to human dignity:
I think that modeling our moral understanding on the legal categories is quite promising.
Don't worry, I have some reservations. But mostly what I want to
do is continue further down the same path. Here's the nub of what
I'm after: aristocratic dignity, like the academic lectern, has attractive features. But it also has decidedly unattractive features. These
features are themselves deeply embedded in modem law. They are
embedded, too, more broadly in morality and everyday social life.
I think Waldron is missing how much reconstruction aristocratic
dignity needs to do the work he wants it to.
So: the Countess of Rutland, Waldron tells us, enjoyed a couple
of remarkable legal privileges. She couldn't be bodily seized or jailed
for debt. Now we all enjoy those privileges. There's a lovely case of
leveling up.
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But compare: In 1573 England, John Fortescue had a problem.
His neighbor, Lord Grey de Wilton, liked to go hunting-and trespass on land in which Fortescue had the right of free warren. Fortescue complained repeatedly. The lord's jaunty response? "Stuffe a
turd in your teethe," he told his neighbor. "I will hunt it, and it shall
be hunted in spite of all you can do."1 There were Star Chamber
proceedings between the two.2 Grey ambushed Fortescue and beat
him, knocking him off his horse. Fortescue was no ordinary commoner: he was a member of Parliament and would go on to become
chancellor of the exchequer. Queen Elizabeth's displeasure with
Grey led the poor lord to spend some time in Fleet Prison.
So much for dispute resolution, claim and counterclaim, and reason-giving among the dignified. But it's worse than that. Grey's
"turd in your teeth" would have been exactly right had he been addressing any ordinary commoner. Yes, England offered aristocrats
fewer formal legal privileges than did the rest of Europe. But even
in England, peers of the realm couldn't be arrested except for treason, felony, and breach of the peace. They couldn't be forced to
appear in court on most writs. They didn't have to testify under
oath: how insulting not to take their word for it! No wonder a 1648
petition to the House of Commons (and there are others like it)
implored them to make "Kings, Queens, Princes, Dukes, Earls,
Lords, and all persons, alike liable to every law of the land ... so all
persons even the Highest might fear and stand in a~ and neither
violate the publick peace, nor private right of person or estate, (as
hath been frequent) without being lyable to accompt as other
men." 3
Here's Edward Hyde, later Earl of Clarendon, addressing the
House of Commons in 1640:
He told them another Story as ridiculous, of a Gentleman, who, owing
his Taylor a long Time a good Sum of Money for Cloaths, and his Taylor
coming one Day to his Chamber, with more than ordinary Importunity
for his Debt, and not receiving any good Answer, threatened to arrest

ARISTOCRATIC DIGNITY? • :10:l

him; upon which the Gentleman, enraged, gave him very ill Words, called
him base Fellow, and laid his hands upon him to thrust him out of his
chamber: in this Struggle, and under this Provocation, Oppression, and
Reproach, the poor Taylor chanced to say, that He was as good a Man as
the other; for which Words He was called into the Marshal's Court; and
for his Peace, was content to be satisfied his Debt, out of his own ill Manners; being compelled to release all his other Demands in Lieu of
Damages.4
I offer these vignettes not to produce a few stray details from the
rich and repellent history of the British aristocracy, nor so that you
can join a campaign to reintroduce "a turd in your teeth" into everyday use. Instead, I want the example to set up this point: at the
heart of the dignity enjoyed by aristocrats was the claim, "I don't
hav~ to answer to the likes of you." That claim, which took specific
legal form, is deeply antithetical to the version of dignity Waldron
wants to tease out, and again it's deeply entrenched. So we need to
do two things. We need to get it into focus. Then we need to think
about what kind of work needs to be done to reconstruct noble dignity so it can do the work we want it to. It may be that we face more
work than just paring off the bad parts.
First things first: let's focus. Take the canonical form for royal
proclamations: "it is our royal pleasure ..." Or take the form of
royal assent for signing a bill from Britain's Parliament into law, a
typically bastardized bit of law-French: nta Reyne le veult," or the
queen wills it. Today this is mere verbal form. Once it was real, and
it underlined that mere will or even caprice was enough. Here we
have authority exercised without even a shred of a pretense that it
is reasoned judgment. So Shakespeare's Henry V starts a war with
France because he's insulted by a gag with some tennis balls and
stops it because he falls in love with Catherine of Valois. The poor
subjects of the realm careen around at his whim.
Or take the advice another seventeenth-century aristocrat, the
Earl of Derby, offered his son: "Undertake no suit against a poor
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man ... for then you make him your equal." 5 Listen to Charles I,
demanding money from Parliament in 1628: "Take not this as a
threatning (for I scorn to threaten any but my equals)." 6 That
same year, at the election at Lewes, the gentry found it degrading
to have their names on the same electoral rolls as those of the
enfranchised commoners, so they refused to vote. 7 Two centuries
later, the same sensibility surfaced in frenzied Tory complaints
about the Reform Bill of 1832. Here's Sir Charles Wetherell, addressing the House of Commons during the bill's second reading,
July 6, 1831:
A more rash and tyrannical innovation on the constitution than the
present had, he said, never been attempted,-the tendency of the
measure was to democratize, he had almost said to sansculottize
the constitution. The ten pound voters were a mere mockery of a representative body. He ventured to assert it as a proposition in the
abstract, that ten pound men were not fit for the enjoyment of the
elective franchise. What! he would ask the gentlemen opposite, was
this their conservative body? the respectable constituency of the
parish workhouse! For his part, he considered that to solicit votes in
the lazaretto-in pauper establishments-was degrading to the character, qualifications, and station of a representative. 8

Wetherell was recorder of Bristol. When he showed up there a few
months after delivering himself of this genial sentiment, he was
met with jeers and stones. When he offered to imprison those responsible, riots began. By the end, buildings lay in smoking rubble
and a dozen were dead-no doubt confirming Wetherell's jaundiced
estimate of the lower orders.
The good news for Waldron's thesis is that law was already a
realm for the give-and-take of reasons and arguments, justifications and criticisms, among dignified equals. The bad news is that
that is precisely why the nobility often wanted nothing to do with
it. How unseemly to be shoved into a position where you had to
answer to the base underlings I
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Let me revisit the legal tagline Waldron approvingly adduces:
Englishman's home is his castle. u That, too, might seem to
have an endearingly lofty ring about it: your home might be
modest, might even be a dump, but in it you're an aristocrat. The
reality is rather less charming. Coke echoes a series of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century commentators in 6nding
here legal license to use armed, even deadly, force against intruders.9 But this too is a kind of unaccountability. Without the common
law's now familiar enquiry into whether the man defending his
house had a reasonable belief that his (or some other occupant's)
life or limb was threatened, the unaccountability is stark: the state
will not second-guess his judgment about what kind of force he
needed to use.
More dramatically, the state's jurisdiction, the reach of the law,
stops at the threshold. Through early modernity, the standard view
was that the government ruled not over individuals but over male
heads of households. This view was formally reaffirmed by the revolutionary assembly in France. A man's house is his castle because
inside it, he rules as absolute sovereign. A special dignity for himand indignity, and helplessness, for others. I suspect, though I don't
have enough evidence up my sleeve to be confident, that this view,
rather more than the fact of the marriage contract, explains why
the law found it so hard to frame marital rape as a crime. Here, by
the way, liberal individualism shouldn't be condemned as sociologically naive or pernicious. It should be embraced as offering legal
recourse and dignity to those on the other side of the threshold,
once invisible.
So again, at the core of the legal dignity enjoyed by aristocrats is
something like this: I enjoy special privileges and need not answer
to the likes of you for how I use them. That is not something we
have made available to everyone. Nor is it something we should.
But that core still shows up, curiously, in modem law, notwithstanding all our commitments to liberalism, democracy, equality,
the rule of law, and the like.
uAn
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I don't mean qualified or even absolute privileges that we justify
as instrumentally required to get a job done. The Constitution, for
instance, says that "for any Speech or Debate in either House,"
senators and representatives "shall not be questioned in any other.
Place."10 On the fl.om:; your senator can slander you to his heart's
content. The language will be published in the Congressional
Record. And you won't be able to sue him. Why? Because we want
to be sure to preserve robust debate. But those kinds of privileges
are connected to what Waldron calls condition status. No surprise
that when William Proxmire was sued for lambasting the recipient
of one of his Golden Fleece Awards off the floor of the Senate, he
didn't enjoy immunity.11
What about Florida's embrace of the so-called castle doctrine?
This statute overturns long-standing common law.12 Suppose you're
in your house or other dwelling, or even your car, and someone is
"unlawfully and forcefully entering." You may use deadly force
against him and Florida will presume that you had a reasonable fear
of death or great bodily harm, which will then excuse your action
as self-defense. For today's purposes, I don't care if you cheer or
deplore this legal innovation. And it is, for sure, universal. But what
it extends is "I can kill someone in my house and I needn't answer
for it." In this way, Florida has made its homeowners, apartmentdwellers, and even drivers aristocrats for a day--or, I suppose, not
for any particular time, but any time at all when they're in their
special castles. I won't be surprised if courts try to haul the statute
back toward the common law. But it's worth remembering that
plenty of public celebration of Florida's act depended on the cruder
thought that you should be free to kill intruders. It's worth remembering too that state after state is adopting similar legislation.
Or consider the bizarre doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution says that a citizen of
one state can't sue another state in federal court. In 1887, the Supreme Court said this was a matter of dignity: "The very object and
purpose of the 11th amendment were to prevent the indignity of

ARISTOC:RATIC DIGNITY 7

•

105

subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties." 13 In 1890, the Supreme Court held that
individuals can't sue states, period, even if they are citizens of that
very state: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. "14 (So
much for the dictates of plain text!) This law is alive and well. Writing for the Court in 2002, Justice Thomas insisted, "The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities."15
Yes, states may graciously deign to let their citizens sue them. But
nothing requires them to waive immunity. If they choose not to,
they can exult in their legal dignity and say to you, stuff a turd in
your teeth. The putative justifications sometimes offered for sovereign immunity are quite obviously threadbare. So, we're sometimes
told, the state is busy with important tasks and has better things to
do than answer lawsuits. The same might be said of General Motors.
Or again, we're sometimes reminded that finally taxpayers foot the
bill of lawsuits, so "we" would be suing "ourselves." But if you sue
GM for selling you a defective car that got you hurt in an accident,
we don't bar the suit if we learn that you're a shareholder in the
corporation. And yes, I know that some of us are weirdly inclined to
treat corporations with the same deference some are inclined to
treat governments.
Bette~ as usual, not to lose ourselves in the abstractions. What
does sovereign immunity mean on the ground 7 In April 2005,
Susan Birk gave birth to her daughte~ Vayle. The infant needed
emergency surgery and she needed it in a hurry. The transport
team showed up eighty minutes later than they said they would.
That lost time meant everything: Vayle suffered "severe, permanent brain damage, among other things." Pursuant to Connecticut
law, Birk and her husband, acting for Vayle, sought permission to
sue the state-the medical facilities screwing up were public. The
claims commissioner rejected her claim because she hadn't filed
some of the relevant paperwork. The family then sought to reopen
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the claim, the commissioner agreed to let them sue-and then a
state court said no, he had no legal authority to reopen the case. So
the state would remain legally immune, in a setting where private
parties would have been paying millions of dollars. 16
Some critics think it's conceptually confused to attribute dignity
to states. I think that's wrong: it depends on a bankrupt methodological individualism that somehow passes for hardheaded wisdom
these days, though I haven't space to attack the view here. Anyway
I think the view that states have dignity-or, better, the sort of dignity that means they can sniff disdainfully and refuse to answer
citizens' complaints in courts of law-is perfectly coherent. It's just
repellent, an affront to the rule of law. In this way, our governments.
enjoy just the kind of legal dignity aristocrats once did. But their
being unanswerable for their injuries and affronts is miles away
from the vision of dignity Waldron rightly affirms. So it's not
enough to say we've leveled up. Human dignity has to be more
than offering everyone the kind of legal dignity once enjoyed by
aristocrats. It has to reconstruct or reject that dignity because we
have no interest in casting dignity as the haughty business of behaving badly and refusing to be held accountable for it. "Rank has
its privileges": that is the loathsome underbelly, or maybe prominently displayed belly, of the noble dignity Waldron is embracing.

. . .

Before I gesture toward how a reconstruction might go, I have two
sneers for you. (No, not at you.)
The first is from Jeremy Bentham advising Greek legislators in
1823. "Never is the day labourer, never is the helpless pauper, an .
object of contempt to me: I can not say the same thing of the purseproud aristocrat: I can not say the same thing of the ancestry-proud
aristocrat: I can not say the same thing of the official bloodsucker:
I can not say the same thing of the man covered with the tokens of
factitious honor: least of all can I say the same of a King." 17
The second is recorded by the poet Thomas Moore six years later.
Its victim is Robert Peel, the great Tory who would become prime
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minister. Peel's father had gotten fabulously wealthy in textiles, so
poor Peel, nouveau riche that he was, had, as Moore reports others
felt, "vulgar manners." "This, it seems, is a favourite subject of
merriment with the King, who sometimes says 'Now, I shall call
Peel over to me-watch him, as he comes-he can't even walk like
a gentleman'-These people, in their insolence, attribute this want
of gentleman-like air in Peel to his birth. As if some of the highest
among themselves had not the looks & minds of waiters." 18 Yes,
there's a sneer in there at waiters, but that's not the one I wantyet. I want you to ponder the king and his merry little band of
aristocrats, obnoxious gods from Mount Olympus, toying with and
belittling poor Peel, chuckling at his awkward gait, banding together
as superiors who cement their dignified status by having ridiculous
underlings around and rejoicing in their ridiculousness.
These sneers are glimpses of a long-running cultural war over
contempt and therefore over dignity. Waldron affectionately quotes
Robert Burns's verse, with its endearing refrain, "A man's a man for
a' that." That one gives you the benign picture of leveling up: hey,
we're not low-lifes, we're every bit as dignified as the nobility. Bentham's sneer is different. It inverts the usual status hierarchy. Bentham has no contempt for workers and paupers: they're dignified
figures. But he says he does have contempt for aristocrats and kings.
Indeed, he boasts about it. It's as if the only way to be dignified is to
scorn the credentials of the well-born.
So Bentham sneers at the king and the king sneers at Peel. No
one here has the idea of meeting as dignified equals. It's only a
question of who's on top. This cultural war is long-running-indeed, it's not over-and it's fought on many fronts. It's fought out
in august moments of public law, such as the French revolutionary
assembly somberly voting to strip France's aristocrats of one privilege after another. It's fought out in episode after episode in private
law, such as what sorts of cuffs and beatings will and won't be actionable in tort instead of privileged as discipline. It's fought out in
the nitty-gritty scenes of everyday life, where we struggle over
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flared nostrils; deliberate shoves and inadvertent ones, too; respectful eye contact, unpleasantly prolonged stares, and that particular,
peculiar kind of blithe disregard that involves looking straight
through somebody. And it has other moments of startling inve~
sion, such as commoners dueling to boost their social status.19
Here dignity isn't readily available to one and all. People are
scuffling for it and an ever-tempting way to climb the ladder of
dignity is to push others down. It's a mistake to think that dignity
is necessarily what economists call a positional good. But often it
has been. Often it still is. I'm absolutely with Waldron in seeking an
account of human dignity that makes it available to one and all. But
that means positional accounts of dignity, ones depending on exalted position over the base underlings, aren't merely unattractive.
They're nonstarters as a matter of logic. Those are my two sneers
and those are their stakes.
Next I want to introduce a distinction in social theory. Waldron
offers some sensible ways of thinking about the concept of status.
Here's another one-anyway I hope it's sensible-which depends on
contrasting it with the idea of a social role. Let's say that your status
follows you across the whole social landscape. Aristocratic status is
like that. You're a duke not only when you proudly survey your dominions; not only when you assure your impoverished tenants that
you'll instruct your agent to be less harsh with them about making
payments; and not only when you promenade at court in your ermine
robes, drink too much sherry, and grope the servant maids. You're a
duke 24/7, as we might say today. You require special treatment no
matter where you are, no matter what you're doing. In church you
will sit in a grand pew at the front. In Parliament you will be entitled
to a seat in the House of Lords. The tailor will come to your estate
and if he dares to demand that you pay your debts, you'll have your
way with him, socially and legally, for his audacity. If for some reason
you appear in the marketplace, others will bow low or even fawn and
scrape, make way for you, and ask what you want in submissive tones
they don't use for any old customer. And so on.
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But a role is just a position in some institution. So it's something
you ordinarily shift in and out 0£ unless you're unlucky enough to
be captive of one of Erving Goffman's total institutions. Writing or
delivering these comments, I'm a professor. I suppose there's a sense
in which I'm a professor when I'm grocery shopping-it's still my
job-and sometimes my younger daughter teases me about my unimpeachable claims to expertise in jazz by saying, noh, right, you're
a law professor," words she draws out with comically ironical awe.
But-trust me-I don't quote Bentham at the supermarket. And
I suppose you don't open your laptops and take notes on the dinner
conversation when you're visiting your family. When Bill Ford,
great-grandson of Henry and then CEO of Ford, showed up at a
dinner meeting at my daughter's elementary schooL he grabbed the
same paper plates and plastic utensils the rest of us did, he stood in
line with the rest of us, and he ate the same gloppy food. And a
damned good thing: he was there as parent of a student, not as CEO.
We no longer imagine society as one unified hierarchy. Because of
social differentiation-the emergence of a host of largely autonomous institutions-that view has become empirically implausible.
Instead we see a series of institutions-states, economic 6.rms, families, universities, Boy Scout troops, you name it-with reasonably
clear jurisdictional boundaries.
It is a feature, not a bug, of Waldron's account that human dignity is in this way a status. It follows us around relentlessly: or
anyway we want it to and think it should. We may need to punish
criminals. But it is still cause for grave concern, even horro~ when
we gratuitously humiliate them, let alone torture them. We don't
want to crush their dignity. So, too, our bodies may betray us. We
may become incontinent. We may drool uncontrollably or twitch
badly or shuffle along hunched over and hesitantly instead of walking upright and briskly. But there is something worrisome about
people who mock or flinch at what we rightly describe as these indignities, let alone those tone-deaf buffoons who sneer at the very
idea of death with dignity. No matter what our social or biological
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plight, we are entitled to dignity. So I think the distinction between
status and role brings out a decided merit of Waldron's account: it
highlights the crucial fact that our dignity doesn't simply attach to
particular roles. The relevant sense of dignity here is not the sort
you forfeit by slipping on a banana peel or lecturing with your fly
unzipped or anything like that. Indeed, at stake in Waldron's concern with how we treat criminals is that you can't forfeit this kind
of dignity even by grotesque immorality. That is, criminals still
have claims on how we may and may not treat them: no abuse, no
torture, no officially sponsored or officially neglected rape. That we
flout these claims on a daily, ongoing, bureaucratized basis depends
in part on a kind of aristocratic contempt for the underlings.
It is then another feature, not a bug, of Waldron's account that it
helps explain and justify why we worry endlessly about gende:r;
race, social class, sexual orientation, and the like. For these, too,
seem to work as social statuses. And, depending of course on what
status you occupy, they may open you up to indignity after indignity. I have nothing nice to say about the jargon and canting of
much work in the humanities these days. But concerns about these
matters are not in fact the hangover of the 1960s or the special preoccupation of tenured radicals. Try this, from Mary Wollstonecraft's
best book, her observations on Scandinavia:

In fact, the situation of the servants in every respect, particularly that of
the women, shews how far the swedes are from having a just conception
of rational equality. They are not termed slaves; yet a man may strike a
man with impunity because he pays him wages; though these wages are
so low, that necessity must teach them to pilfer, whilst servility renders
them false and boorish. Still the men stand up for the dignity of man, by
oppressing the women. The most menial, and even laborious offices,
are therefore left to these poor drudges. Much of this I have seen. In
the winter, I am told, they take the linen down to the rivei; to wash it
in the cold water; and though their hands, cut by the ice, are cracked and
bleeding, the men, their fellow servants, will not disgrace their manhood
by carrying a tub to lighten their burden.20
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Even among the wretched servants, the men propped up their dignity by mistreating the women. Wollstonecraft already knew the
personal and private were political.
Is domestic service itself a hateful affront to human dignity? By
1699, catch fart had passed into the English language, at least the
colorful version of it spoken by deviants, as slang for a footboy. 21
(And this, alas, after I ruminated on "stuff a turd in your teeth."
This is my plot to clinch the award for most scatological Tanner
commentator.) It was still in use at the end of the eighteenth century, and one dictionary spells out the point: "CATCH FART. A footboy; so called from such servants commonly following dose behind
their master or mistress." 22 Whether a footboy can be digni6.ed,
whether any number of so-called menial occupations can be dignified, what we should make of Thomas Moore's sneer that some
aristocrats have manners no better than those of waiters: all this
raises struggles over the dignity of labor whose pursuit would take
me too far afield. I'd notice only that when devoted service becomes
one's only task-when we're talking about live-in servants with no
serious time off to pursue other activities, to occupy other rolesit's harder to see it as digni6.ed. Why? Because then one's identity
threatens to collapse all the way into the job.
James Boswell feasted on the same gender dynamics that made
Wollstonecraft's gorge rise. Take this 1762 journal entry:

Indeed, in my mind, there cannot be higher felicity on earth enjoyed by
man than the participation of genuine reciprocal amorous affection with
an amiable woman. There he has a full indulgence of all the delicate feelings and pleasures both of body and mind, while at the same time in this
enchanting union he exults with a consciousness that he is the superior
person. The dignity of his sex is kept up. 23

If the dignity of his sex is kept up by romantic affection and sexual
intercourse, the dignity of hers is kept down. For both Wollstonecraft and Boswell, to be male is to be something of an aristocrat.
Wollstonecraft condemns the fact; Boswell embraces it. Here, too,
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we find the motif I focused on earlier: the exercise of exclusive privileges for which one needn't answer to the underlings. Boswell kept
his endless assignations with prostitutes and others secret from his
wife, but that seems to have been a matter of prudently avoiding
domestic conflict, not any acknowledgment that what he was doing
was wrong. He'd not have had the same stance about any infidelity
of hers.
So we have the idea of a valuable status, human dignity, that you
don't relinquish, no matter what social setting you find yourself in.
This means that dignity can't be a wholesale attack on status. But
we also have the idea of inferior or base statuses, some of them the
sort that Goffman identified as stigma, that you don't relinquish,
either. We'd like to get rid of those in the name of human dignity.
Not any old status will do, and as you now know, I am skeptical of
the claim that aristocratic status is what we're after.
So status is crucial. But I think we can get some more purchase
on the idea of dignity by thinking about roles. In any given social
setting, we're selectively forgetful: we ignore considerations irrelevant to the business at hand. When you go to vote in a primary, it
may matter whether you're a Republican or a Democrat. But it
doesn't matter whether you're a Catholic or a Jew or an atheist,
whether you root for the Boston Red Sox or the New York Yankees,
whether you are an especially loving parent or happen to have no
children. When you go to buy vegetables at the market, you don't
ordinarily care about the religion or politics of the seller. (Whether
the crops are organic might be a political issue, hut that's not the
sense of politics at issue here.) There's a kind of equality in this and
also a kind of dignity: you might be thought badly of in some other
setting, but you leave its concerns behind when you take up a new
role.
We can use the law to model this strand of dignity, too. Justice is
blind: not that judges are tottering and decrepit, but that the law
will resolutely ignore all kinds of facts that might in some other
social setting be perfectly relevant. If English law once had special
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rules to recognize aristocratic status, it also came, sometimes at
least, to ignore and so flout that status. Here's Bentham again, this
time from some of his scribbled notes on French reforms of judicial
procedure:

What then? Are men of the first rank and consideration-are men high
in office-men whose time is not less valuable to the public than to
themselves-are such men to be forced to quit their business, their functions, or what is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of evecy idle or
malicious adversary, to dance attendance upon evecy petty cause? Yes, as
far as it is necessary, they and evecybody. What if, instead of parties, they
were witnesses? Upon business of other people's evecybody is obliged to
attend, and nobody complains of it. Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbucy, and the Lord High Chancello:r; to be passing by in
the same coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman were in
dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-sweeper or
the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon them for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.24
A ugreat man," Bentham went on, might well find talking to attol'neys and testifying before judges "humiliating to his grandeur,"
but no matter. Like it or not, he would have to participate in legal
proceedings. Bentham's nnobody complains of it" is facetious whistling in the dark. He knew full well that aristocrats and other PoohBahs were enraged by the law's commitment to equality, its
cheerfully ignoring their august status and putting them on level
playing fields with such ignoble types as chimney sweeps.
It is painfully obvious that the law doesn't live up to its own ideal
of equality, that justice all too regularly peeks out from behind her
blindfold, that race and class and political power can make all the
difference even when they're entirely irrelevant. So, too, it is painfully obvious that role differentiation more generally doesn't live
up to its own structures of equality. We know that the rich have
more political powe:r; not just more market goodies. You may have
suspected that white men do better on the market. Well, empirical
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studies have shown that white men get offered better prices on cars
and do better in bargaining compared with women and minorities
with the same economic profiles. 25 Let's not even get started about
what happens if you're particularly good-looking-or particularly
not. About such lamentable everyday leakage across roles, institutions, and their jurisdictional boundaries, about the ongoing influence of baleful status categories, I am inclined to say just what
Waldron does. There is a nonnative order here and when our actual
practices don't live up to their own aspirations, we know what's
wrong and we can struggle to improve things.
So where are we 7 To make sense of human dignity, we need to
hang on to the form of status, understood as something that travels
with you everywhere you go, not just a role you occupy now and
again. But law's blindness to irrelevant facts, its brushing aside the
content of lots of status claims as irrelevant to the matter at hand,
is one of our most powerful images of equality-and of dignity. Just
think of Bentham's chimney sweep issuing a subpoena to the duke.
Waldron is right, too, in urging that we need more than mere form:
we want to illuminate the fact that everyone enjoys a high status,
not just that everyone now has the same status. I am happy to agree
that some of the content of aristocratic status is helpful: again, recall
the Countess of Rutland's enjoying the special privileges not to be
seized or jailed for debt and how we've now extended that to everyone. But too much of what aristocrats had, in law and society, is
stuff we want to abolish, not extend to everyone. We don't want
even furtively to embrace having special perks and not answering
to others for your mistreatment of them. And again, desirability
aside, we can't coherently embrace anything positional.
So what else can we say about the content of human dignity? I'm
a fox, not a hedgehog: I rather doubt there is one big imposing thing
to say about such topics. I suppose my rejection of much of noble
dignity and privilege might seem a rejection of Waldron's central
thesis. But I'd rather see it as a partial emptying out of Waldron's
view. I think we can still go far by thinking about how the law treats
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people. I am wholly in agreement, for instance, with Waldron's suggestion that the law credits us with self-command, and that that is an
ascription of dignity. I shall underline, what he does not, that command theories of law are then deeply defective-as if we were terrified privates confronted with a sadistic sergeant in basic training.
I want to close with yet another quotation. I hope you'll forgive
me not just for its length but also for not delicately skipping over
the excruciating language it contains. (Squirming or breaking a
sweat or flushing with anger at this language, I note polemically,
isn't a sign of mindless PC orthodoxy; it is a visceral sign of our
commitment to human dignity.) It is one of my favorite stories
about human dignity. Thomas de Quincey says he got this story
from William Hazlitt, the fabulous essayist, staunch democrat, and
garden-variety misogynist. Anyway, the Duke of Cumberland is
out for a walk:
His Royal Highness had rooms in St. James's; and one day, as he was issuing
from the palace into Pall-Mall, Hazlitt happened to be immediately behind

him: he could therefore watch his motions along the whole line of his progress. It is the custom in England, wheresoever the persons of the royal family
are familiar to the public eye, as at Windso~ &c., that all passengers in the
street, on seeing them, walk bare-headed, or make some signal of dutiful
respect. On this occasion all the men who met the prince took off their hats,
the prince acknowledging every such obeisance by a separate bow. Pall-Mall
being finished, and its whole harvest of royal salutations gathered in, next
the Dulre came to Cockspur Street. But here, and taking a station close to the
crossing, which daily he beautified and polished with his broom, stood a
negro sweep. If human at all,-which some people doubted,-he was pretty
nearly as abject a representative of our human family divine as can ever have
existed. Still he was held to be a man by the law of the land; which would
have hanged any person, gentle or simple, £or cutting his throat. Law (it is
certain) conceived him to be a man, however poor a one, though medicine, in
an undeP.tone, muttered sometimes a demur to that opinion. But here the
sweep was, whether man or beast, standing humbly in the path of royalty:
vanish he would not; he was (as the Tunes says of the Com League) "a great
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fact," if rather a muddy one; and, though, by his own confession (repeated
one thousand times a-day), both "a nigger" and a sweep, ("Remember poor
niggei; your honour! remember poor sweep!"), yet the creature could take
off his rag of a hat and earn the bow of a prince as well as any white native
of St. James's. What was to be done? A great case of conscience was on the
point of being raised in the person of a paralytic nigger; nay, possibly a state
question.-Ought a son of England, could a son of England, descend from
his majestic pedestal to gild with the rays of his condescension such a grub,
such a very doubtful grub, as this? Total Pall-Mall was sagacious of the
coming crisis; judgment was going to be delivered; a precedent to be raised;
and Pall-Mall stood still, with Hazlitt at its head, to learn the issue. How if
the black should be a Jacobin, and (in the event of the duke's bowing) should
have a bas-relief sculptured on his tomb exhibiting an English prince and a
German king as two separate personages in the act of worshiping his broom 7
Luckily it was not the black's province to settle the case. The Dulce of Cumberland, seeing no counsel at hand to argue either the pro or the contra,
found himself obliged to settle the question de piano; so, drawing out his
purse, he kept his hat as rigidly settled on his head as William Penn and
Mead did before the Recorder of London. All Pall-Mall applauded; contradicente Gulielmo Hazlitt, and Hazlitt only. The black swore that the prince
gave him half-a-crown; but whether he regarded this in the light or a godsend to his avarice or a shipwreck to his ambition-whether he was more
thankful for the money gained, or angry for the honour lost-did not transpire. "No mattei;" said Hazlitt; "the black might be a £ooh but I insist upon
it that he was entitled to the ~ since all Pall-Mall had it before him, and
that it was unprincely to refuse it."26
There's legal equality here, and hurray for that. But if we're tempted
to model human dignity, as a moral and finally a social ideal, on
aristocratic dignity, we're going to have to think hard about the
duke's offering money (maybe) but not a bow, and why the crowd
approved, and why Hazlitt didn't. I think finally we're going to have
to adopt Hazlitt's sensibility here as our own and think about how
sadly comfortable we remain with aristocratic deference, with receiving it, offering it, extorting it, and-whether we are on the receiving or offering end-basking in it.
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But notice, finally, how Hazlitt voices his complaint: he says the
duke's snub was unprincely. An intriguing bit of leveling up is
available here, and this bit, I'm happy to say, fits Waldron's central
thesis perfectly: we can help undergird human dignity by universalizing the easy grace and civility of the best aristocrats.
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